Malaysia's Foreign Policy Strategy

Malaysia's Foreign Policy Strategy
And Turkey*

By Abdul Rahman Bin Adam

Centre for History, Politics and Strategic Studies

National University of Malaysia (UKM)

Bangi, Selangor Malaysia

* This is a shorter version of the paper presented at the 1st International Turkish Asian Congress organised by The Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies (TACSS) in Istanbul, from 25-27 May 2006 which appeared in STRATEGI Volume 12, 2005/06; published by MAFDC.


In his address to the “The Conference of Malaysian Heads of Mission” in July, 2004 Prime Minister Dato’ Abdullah Ahmad Badawi stressed that “The thrust and purpose of Malaysia’s foreign policy has always been, and will continue to be, the protection and promotion of national interest. Malaysia has no ideology to export and it has no secret agenda to carry out anywhere in the world. We will, however, work to promote the establishment of a regional and international environment that is stable and peaceful.”[1] For her part, Malaysia must strive to continue maintaining an independent and non aligned foreign policy in order to be able to exercise flexibility in safeguarding the national interest.

It would be instructive at the outset to deal with the present air of anticipation and expectation that one sensed in the Malaysian foreign policy with the arrival of a new prime minister, a new government—and a new approach. The change from the previous regime has been unmistakable—and remarkable. The changes have been rhetorical, symbolic and concrete.

Rhetorically, the speeches that Prime Minister Dato’ Abdullah Ahmad Badawi gave at home or abroad made all the right noises about policies. As for symbolism, there was no better example of the symbolic shift than the appearance of the prime minister himself in the working life of the masses. His tagline “work with me not work for me” stance endeared him to the broad masses which translate into enormous popular vote for ruling coalition in 2004 general election. Likewise, there has been no better example of the concrete shift in policy than the speedy announcement of Malaysia’s willingness to begin negotiations with neighbours Singapore and the United States on matters of vital interest.[2]There is, in short, considerable cause for anticipation that indeed the change of prime minister augurs well for a new era in Malaysian foreign policy. How does this seemingly new dynamism augur for Malaysia/Turkey relations? For this purpose the paper shall focus on three areas as follows: Malaysia’s Foreign Policy Strategy; Important Issue Areas in Malaysian Foreign Policy and Malaysia Turkey Relations

Malaysia’s Foreign Policy Strategy

Fundamentally Malaysia’s Foreign Policy Strategy is enshrined in the country’s “Vision 2020” which is strategize through the 5 Year Plan. The PM recently said that Malaysia will strive to foster an external environment that is conducive to the accomplishment of the objectives of the Ninth Malaysia Plan.[3] Malaysia will work to strengthen cooperation, peace and stability in the region and beyond, because Malaysia’s economy cannot prosper otherwise.

In this instance Malaysia will aggressively undertake initiatives to seek new markets, promote our exports, attract investments and increase tourism. To these ends, we will also improve capacity in the institutions that are primarily responsible for preserving and promoting our interests abroad. The strategy is operationalised through several approaches

Strategy Operationalised[4]

Positive bilateral relations. Even when irritants exist in particular contexts, Malaysia will nonetheless continue to foster good bilateral relations, in both scope and depth, with other countries. Positive bilateral relations represent the basic building block for regional and international cooperation. Malaysia continues win-win formulas and resolves all differences peacefully, through negotiations.

ASEAN. For attaining regional objectives and strength in numbers, Malaysia continues to promote regionalism. Malaysia firmly believed that peace, freedom, social justice and economic wellbeing were best attained by fostering good understanding, good neighbourliness and meaningful cooperation amongst countries in the region. Clearly, ASEAN will remain the cornerstone of Malaysia's foreign policy.

Role in the multilateral level. This will be another enduring feature of Malaysia's foreign policy. Malaysia endevours to promote the interests and rights of developing countries and be engaged in the evolution of universal principles, norms, standards and rules on issues that affect the world community. Malaysia will remain in the forefront of reforms of the international system. In this endeavor, Malaysia will need the support of allies from among the south countries - through ASEAN and other south groups such as the Group of 15 (G 15) and the Group of 77 and D8. Malaysia will continue to remain strongly committed to South-South Cooperation, not only in terms of sharing technical knowledge but also in terms of increasing South-South trade and investment.

Role of the United Nations. Foremost among the world bodies would be the United Nations (UN) itself and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The World Bank and the IMF, which will continue to influence the international financial system, must be reformed if it is to serve the interests of all countries. Malaysia will continue to use the platforms available to speak on global issues such as development, mobilisation of additional and new resources, environmental degradation, democracy, non-proliferation issues, reform of the United Nations and the need to bring into being a new international financial architecture.

Role of the NGOs. Malaysia accepts that international relations in general and multilateral diplomacy in particular will increasingly need to take cognizance of the role played by non-state actors, especially the NGOs. Malaysia acknowledges that NGOs can exert considerable influence on the shape of policies on specific issues. Malaysia will cooperate with NGOs; in particular indigenous NGOs, to advance national as well as global interests.
Trade, investment and finance. A prerequisite for achieving developed­ nation status is for Malaysia to develop abilities to compete in a globalised economy. Principally, this would require on the part of Malaysia a strengthening of its capacities, not only at the national but also at the international level, in the areas of trade, investment and finance. Diplomacy in the 21st century is bound to be driven by economic and social issues because the new focus of global attention will be the wellbeing of the human person.

Important Issue Areas in Malaysian Foreign Policy

Various geopolitical determinants contribute to the shaping of Malaysia’s foreign policy. Indeed Malaysia is at a unique moment of opportunity because of her leadership of ASEAN and the Organization of Islamic Conference and the NAM group and Malaysia can work closely and cooperate within the international for a on a lot of different measures – from security to economic development to counterterrorism efforts.[5] How does Malaysia measured up to these strategic visions? It would be realistic that the visions be evaluated as a report card pertaining to the important issue areas in Malaysian Foreign Policy. These are common issue areas shared by both Malaysia and Turkey. In the nutshell these are:

Malaysia’s Role in the OIC. Malaysia played its major part in the establishment of the OIC in 1969. Malaysia’s commitment to the OIC and the ideals it portend can best be summed by the Prime Minister in December 2005 when he stressed that “the Muslim Ummah could no longer be in a state of denial and that the causes for the miserable conditions in which it finds itself today must be confronted and addressed in a holistic manner, inter alia, through building capacities as well as the projection of the true image of Islam and its civilizational approaches.”[6] He informed that Malaysia had offered to host meetings to discuss good governance and the establishment of a rapid response mechanism to alleviate the impact of natural disasters in OIC Member States. In line with this, Malaysia spearheaded the restructuring of the OIC General Secretariat and hopes that the OIC will be able to function better and more efficiently with the necessary commitment and support of all its Member States. Malaysia believes that OIC has a pivotal role to play to represent the Islamic Ummah especially during times of great challenge as is being faced by the Ummah today.

A protocol on the preferential tariff scheme was signed between the OIC and Malaysia on 28 March 2006. With Malaysia acceding to the protocol, the number of countries signing the protocol increases to five, which include Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia.

International Terrorism and Measures Taken. In the fight against International terrorism, Malaysia do not subscribe to the general notion of a unified general theory explaining all terrorist behaviour. Malaysia believed that there is not a ‘one size that fits all’ explanation.[7] Dr. Mahathir has been resolute in demonstrating internationally that Malaysia can manage terrorism independently. On this particular resoluteness, Michael Danby, who is a Labour member of Melbourne Ports in the Australian House of Representatives and secretary of the Labor National Security Committee, wrote:

“If we had to ask which leader of an Islamic country has done the most, in practical terms, to crack down on organizations which support, fund and carry out terrorist attacks, the answer would have to be the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad. He opposes Islamist terrorism not because it harms the West or kills Westerners, but because he thinks it is un- Islamic and harmful to the Islamic cause. Some tough-minded analysts loathe [Mahathir Mohamad] but judge him to be politically "useful," if aesthetically revolting.” [8]

In terms of legislation, Malaysia has a comprehensive compendium of 55 laws that can be utilized in the ongoing efforts to combat terrorism. Foremost of these are the Penal Code and the Internal security Act 1960.In terms of regional effort, Malaysia supports ASEAN taking a more active role against terrorists and avoiding a U.S.-led war in the region. Malaysia is also involved in counter-terrorism efforts under APEC which have established several mechanisms to collect and distribute information to its members.

Malaysia again demonstrated its commitment in the fight against terrorism by hosting the regional counter-terrorism center. Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCT), have conducted several seminars and training. Recently Malaysian Prime Minister during a visit to the United States announced that Malaysia is to establish an international centre to fight cyber-terrorism, providing an emergency response to high-tech attacks on economies and trading systems around the globe.[9] The facility, which is to be sited at the high-tech hub of Cyberjaya outside Kuala Lumpur, would be funded and supported by governments and the private sector.

Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Malaysia is a firm believer that the spread of weapons of mass destruction is one of the main threats to international and regional security. Malaysia’s commitment to the banning of WMD is not only based on humanitarian imperative but also on mitigating the cause of interventionist impulses of the United. As with the war on terrorism, the U.S. approach to combat WMD take full advantage of the application of new technologies, increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis, the strengthening of alliance relationships and the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries and removal of the offending regime by military intervention."[10] (Emphasis added)

Nuclear Proliferation. Like all peace loving nations, Malaysia is all out in her support against Nuclear Proliferation. Despite the promised change in outlook successful outcome of the NPT remained dim because of the chasm between the nuclear-weapon States and their allies and non-nuclear-weapon States on nuclear disarmament. Another important facet of the NPT that Malaysia argued should not be subjected to double standard is that the NPT also provides for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The free, unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes must be fully ensured. Nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting this right. Nuclear-weapon States, in cooperation among themselves and with non-nuclear weapon States, and with States not Parties to the Treaty, must refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements.[11] There should also be total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States that are not Parties to the Treaty, without exception. The problem of the Iranian nuclear impasse is a case in point.

The Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI). The noble undertaking spearheaded by the U.S. which can be described as loaded with condescending undertone is to promote political reforms in the Greater Middle East. It is a long-term strategy advocated in U.S. policymaking and academic circles to pressure each of the states of the Middle East to embark on more active political reform, ultimately transitioning to democracy.[12] However, the regimes in the Middle East would resent the interference in their internal affairs and would most likely resist the pressure to democratize them out of existence. For once the power that be in Washington and London and other capital of Europe should listen and get out of their mirrored edifice. True and workable democracy cannot be transplanted. It must be homegrown for it to flourish and nurtured through indigenous template of historical, political and cultural milieus. As clearly illustrated in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is no persuasive evidence to suggest that The Greater Middle East Initiative would produce the desired result. Thus one can paraphrase The Greater Middle East Initiative as The Greater Middle East Intervention and Imperialism, the real agenda hidden behind the euphemism of the former

Democratization and Political Participation. The subject of Malaysian democracy has been and continues to be a theme of intense discourse and political contestation domestically or internationally. Malaysia believed that personal liberty is not carte blanche to limitless freedom. Restrictions on personal and associational political freedoms were justified along three familiar lines: the sensitivity of communal issues whose uncontrolled public debate would be detrimental to social stability, the primacy of uplifting living standards, and the necessity to adapt western liberal democracy to Malaysia's own historical experience and objective conditions.[13] On this score Malaysia do not apology to any quarter domestically or externally. Indeed the current Prime Minister had been increasingly identifying himself with transparency and good governance signals of the possible trend in the future of Malaysian democracy. It is encouraging to note that he is taking appropriate measures to establish a credible civil service, an independent and competent judiciary, improving the delivery system in government and bring a change in the quality of governance with a primary focus at fighting corruption and reducing extravagance.[14]

The commonality and convergence of perception and conviction on the issues areas highlighted above is indeed an important mechanism that regulates Malaysia/Turkey relations.

Malaysia/Turkey Relations

The Political Nexus

A more robust relation between Malaysia and Turkey took shape within the framework of the OIC, South-South Cooperation, NAM and D8. It had its root in Dr. Mahathir’s vision 2020 the way forward which embodies new sets of philosophy introduced based on “prosper thy neighbour” “win-win situation” and “smart partnership”. These have been the guiding philosophy of the Mahathir “assertive activism era”.[15] Turkey as a land bridge to the EU and the greater Middle East would certainly fit into Mahathir’s foreign policy scheme.

Turkey’s value to Malaysia was enhance based on the post-cold war idea that give rise to a Turkish version of Eurasianism, in which Turkey was seen as the epicenter of a land mass extending from the northern Caucasus to the Great Wall of China and from the Adriatic to the Persian Gulf. Malaysia /Turkey relations can be postulated as being regulated by a trichotomy of Political, Economics/Cultural imperatives and defence cooperation.

Ozal/Mahathir. Another very interesting nexus in the development of Malaysia-Turkey relations could be attributed to the common inspiration derived from the thought of al-Afghani. According to Amir Taheri, “of the Muslim political leaders who came to the fore from the 1980s, two stand out: the late Turkish President Turgot Ozal and Malaysia's retiring (now retired) Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed. They based their strategy on the teaching of Jamaleddin Assadabadi (often known as al-Afghani) who believed Islam needed benevolent despots who could create strong governments to withstand the pressure of the European colonial powers.”[16] The two stand out both for their character and their political vision. Neither used power for amassing personal fortune or paving the path of relatives and cronies with gold. Both managed not to become the subject of a cult of personality, a disease that has destroyed many Muslim leaders. At the same time they were arguably the only senior Muslim politicians to rise above the day-to-day management of affairs and to develop a strategic political vision. Not surprisingly, Turkey and Malaysia are, perhaps, the only Muslim states today that could be regarded as relatively successful in both economic and political terms

Erbakan/Mahathir. Following Ozal, it can be recalled that the man who open the Pandora’s Box was the former Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. The 10-day tour of Asia in August 1996, by Turkish delegation led by Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan was touted as a dramatic signal of Turkey's new foreign policy course. The message was clear in that Turkey will attempt to balance the stridently pro-Western posture it has followed since the Second World War by opening doors to the East. Inspired by Islam, Erbakan has raised his horizons much further a field to cover Malaysia and Indonesia that formed part of the thriving economies of East and Southeast Asia.[17] Ultimately he wants Turkey to find a foothold in the prospering markets of the Asia-Pacific rim. Malaysia, still helmed by Dr. Mahathir responded consistent with the strategy chartered in Malaysia’s “Vision 2020”. This is exemplified by the increase in political, military, economic and cultural cooperation with Turkey. Indeed, during the brief premiership of Erbakan there were some steps towards improving and expanding Turkey’s relations with Muslim countries. This strategy had both a bilateral and a multilateral dimension, the latter of which was reflected in the establishment of a so-called group of eight (D 8) which included Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Bangladesh. This development can be seen as increasing another building block in Malaysia Turkey relations.

Erdogan/Mahathir & Abdullah. The current landmark that strengthens the foundation of Malaysia/Turkey relation is attributed to Turkey’s political outlook. Mohammed Ayoob argued that six paradoxes govern Turkey’s political outlooks. One of these is Islam and national identity. The coming to power of the AKP has thrown into sharp relief a paradox that has always been well known to close observer of Turkey: Islam is integral to the definition of Turkish national identity. The AKP's desire to woo Muslim states is one reason. AKP politician Ahmet Davutoglu, previously a professor at the International Islamic University in Malaysia, and now an advisor to both Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, argues that Turkey can remain powerful only if it utilizes the "strategic depth" of its neighborhood, developing better ties with those Muslim neighbors with whom it shares cultural affinity.[18] This stretched to Southeast Asia and Malaysia owns propagation of Islam Hadari has further strengthened the bilateral ties.

The Economic Imperatives

One of the more persuasive raison d’etre that underpinned Malaysia Turkey relations is in the economic realm. In this instance Malaysia is much encouraged by recent Turkish economic achievement. At the Jeddah Economic Forum in February 2006, the Turkish Foreign Minister spoke of Turkey’s achievements, saying, “In the economic sphere, we've been restructuring the Turkish economy. Today Turkey is the 17th largest economy in the world with a GNP exceeding $350 billion. Our trade volume has surpassed $190 billion and there were 22 million tourists in 2005. In the same year, the volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey was several times larger than the total for foreign investments over the last decades. As a matter of fact, Turkey has grown by no less than 30 percent during the past four years.”

Bilateral Trade. Based on the statistics illustrated above the performance of Malaysia-Turkey bilateral trade is anything but wanting. At the second meeting of Turkish-Malaysian Joint Economic Commission that was held in Istanbul on 21 March 2006, Turkish State Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Sahin and Malaysian Minister of International Trade & Industry Datuk Seri Rafidah Aziz signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to improve trade between the two countries. What is interesting is the remark made by the Turkish Minister when delivering a speech at the signing ceremony. In reference to the MoU, the Minister underlined that, “…..it is the second MoU that has been signed between Turkey and Malaysia. The two countries should work hard to enhance economic and commercial relations….”[19] Recalling the signing, Minister Sahin noted that a Turkish delegation would visit Malaysia next year for the third meeting of Turkish-Malaysian Joint Economic Commission. But the underlying message in this whole endavour is clear in that there is a need for both sides “to walk the talk”. Indeed Malaysia has set “the ball rolling” as Rafidah "brings" with her a "huge" delegation comprised 100 private sector representatives from over 50 companies as well as officials from the ministry, Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) and Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation (Matrade).

Tourism Sector. Among tourism promotional activities in Turkey for year 2006:

- Tourism Malaysia Promotion to Istanbul and Ankara, 26-30 March 2006;
- familiarisation trip to Malaysia for selected Turkish agents, Media and TV/Film crew; and
- promotion of “Visit Malaysia Year 2007” to Turkish agents and corporate clients.
- MAS launched a twice weekly direct flight between Istanbul and Kuala Lumpur on 6 December 1989. Load factor averages 65 to 75 per cent.
- No visa required for Turkish citizens entering Malaysia for social visit purpose and vice versa.
- There is no participation from Turkish nationals in the “Malaysia - My Second Home Programme”.

Malaysian Technical Cooperation Programme (MTCP)

Participants From Turkey. From 1983 to 2005, a total of 152 Turkish officials participated in various MTCP programmes, such as in:
- productivity;
- investment;
- programmes in the Public Training Institute (INTAN);
- financing;
- palm oil processing;
- aquaculture; and
- customs procedures and facilitation in the Malaysian Custom Academy (AKMAL).

Defence Cooperation

Training. Since 2005, selected Malaysian army personnel have been sent for training at the Turkish Partnership for Peace Training Centre in Ankara, Turkey. The Turkish Army have offered places in their Peace for Partnership Centre which conducts courses related to peace-keeping and peace support operations during the visit of former Malaysian Army chief Jen Datuk Seri Mohamed Azumi Mohamed to Turkey in June, 2004. The Malaysian Army is taking advantage of the offer because of Turkish Armed Forces’ experience since Turkey is extensively involved in peace support operations and they do have such courses which they are prepared to offer to the Malaysian Army.[20] In addition, the courses were recognised by Western and Asian countries. The peace for partnership initiative played an important role for good relations between nations in Europe and Asia. The programme has been attended by over 45 countries.

Defence Industry. The cooperation under the ADNAN project between Malaysia and Turkey started as early as 1994. This was followed by contract negotiation which began in March 2000 and the contract was officially signed on 25 August 2000.[21] The value of the contract is USD 278,500,000 for which Malaysia get 211 ACV 300 vehicles in 10 configurations plus the offset programme. As far as defence contract goes this is the biggest military purchase from Turkey by the Malaysian government.

The Turkish company involved for this project is FNSS Defence System Inc. based in Ankara Turkey whilst the local beneficiary in Malaysia goes to Deftech DRB Hicom. Malaysian Project Team (MPT) consisting of 5 officers was attached to the company for a period of 40 months overseeing and working together with the company. The project ended up in late 2004 with all vehicles delivered to the Malaysian Armed Forces users with very little complaints.

Concluding Observations

As Malaysia continue to prosper, her foreign policies will become more pragmatic and forward looking. The foreign policies also will become more values driven, in both the bilateral and multilateral context. The challenges of Malaysia foreign policy was clearly enumerated in the vision 2020. On the international level, Malaysia is keen to intensify South-South cooperation. In its quest of new markets for its industry, Malaysia has increasingly been pursuing an active foreign policy in areas beyond its own region, including Latin America and Africa. As a country that promote the Islamic values as a form of good governance, it feels committed to mutual solidarity among all Muslim states. Turkey in this context was seen as a natural leading state to bridge the gap.

Despite the Muslim Ummah newfound independence, the Muslim world today is characterised by paradoxes and contradictions. This is the greatest challenge that both Turkey and Malaysia must resolve. Malaysia fervently hopes that these milieus of paradoxes and apparent contradiction of the Muslim Ummah can be resolved with the cooperation of Turkey. In the process Malaysia and Turkey can posit the benevolence of democracy within the Muslim World based on the theory that democracies do not go to war against other democracies. With its ability to reconcile democracy and Islam and as well as democracy and security, Turkey is the best candidate to suggest and help initiate internal mechanisms for positive change in the Greater Middle East.

Malaysia/Turkey relations must be on the right track too, since it merit mentioned in Washington DC high powered social event. Asli Aydintasbas, a columnists of the Sabah daily who was in attendance at the annual meeting of the American-Turkish Council (ATC) in Washington D.C., explained her impressions in her column that a high-level American official at dinner lamented that he was afraid of Turkey's metamorphosis into a new Malaysia.(Anatolian Times, Turkey March 30 2006). Obviously someone is watching.

Endnotes:

[1] See http://www.pmo.gov.my/ WebNotesApp/ PMMain.nsf/hv_PMKiniSemasaNew/01 df0d8d2bbc883c 48256ec80033e387?OpenDocument &Click= (Visited on 6 May, 2006)

[2] On these sets of policy projections see for example: article by S. Jayasankaran, “Malaysia-Singapore Ties” in Far Eastern Economic Review March 11 , 2004: “Malaysia Seek Dramatic OIC Reform”, interview with Malaysian Foreign Minister in Doha in June 2005 as reported in http://www.islam-online.net/English/%20News/%202005-06/28/article04.shtml; see also “Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Era of Globalization” Remarks by the Malaysian Prime Minister at the Conference of Malaysian Heads of Missions at Putrajaya Convention Centre on 5 July, 2004.

[3] From full text of the PM's 9MP speech to Parliament, The Star, Friday March 31, 2006

[4] Most of the ideas formed and summarized in this section are based on selected speeches of the Foreign Minister found in Selected Foreign Policy Speeches by Syed Hamid Albar, 2005. Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (IDFR) Ministry of foreign Affairs, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

[5] Views made by Karen P. Hughes, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs during interview on TV1 News, Radio Television Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Interview by Hanim Muhili October 23, 2005 http://www.state.gov/r/us/2005/55932.htm (visited on 09 may, 2006)

[6] See Final Communiqué of OIC Summit in Mecca 7-8 December 2005 http://www.palestine-pmc.com/details.asp?cat=2&id=1208 (Visited on 12 May 2006)

[7] See “Islam, Terrorism and Malaysia's Response” By The Honorable Dato Seri Dr. Mahathir Bin Mohamad Prime Minister of Malaysia New York, February 4, 2002 http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/mahathir.html
retrieved on 07 May 2006

[8] See Michael Danby, The Mahathir Paradox in the Jerusalem Post Oct 31, 2003 http://www.geocities.com/%20munichseptember1972/the_mahathir_paradox.htm as retrieved on 07 May 2006

[9] See” Making IMPACT” reported in The Star, 7 May, 2006.

[10] See document at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/wmd_state.htm (Visited on 08 May, 2006)

[11] See Statement by the Hon. Syed Hamid Albar Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia on Behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the General Debate of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons New York Monday, 2 May 2005

[12] See Tamara Cofman Wittes, “The New U.S. Proposal for a Greater Middle East Initiative: An Evaluation “
http://www.brookings.edu/printme.wbs?page=/pagedefs/c9be02d4c9eeff3d59b7b8950a1415cb.xml (Visited on 10 May 2006)

[13] See Syed Ahmad Hussein Malaysia After Mahathir: Continuity With Change http://www.hawaii.edu/cseas%20/pubs/papers/syed.html (Visited on 6 May, 2006)

[14]See http://www.suhakam.org.my/docs/document_resource/WelcomingSpeechMHRD04.pdf (Visited on 10 May 2006)

[15] See for example, Johan Saravanamuttu’s “Iconoclasm and Foreign Policy- The Mahathir Years” in Bridget Welsh ed. 2004 Reflections the Mahathir Years Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University, Southeast Asia Studies Program.

[16] See Amir Taheri What to Do & What Not to Do: Right and Wrong in Turkey and Malaysia http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/379(Visited on 10 May 2006)

[17] See Analysis by Dilip Hiro “Turkey: Erbakan's Balancing Act has Deep Roots in History “ Inter Press Service English News Wire http://www.highbeam.com/library/doc3.asp?docid%20=1P1:2684173%20&refid=%20SEO(Visited on 10 May 2006)

[18] See Ankara Dispatch “Eastern Heading” by Soner Cagaptay at TNR Online Post date 09.08.04 https://ssl.tnr.com/p/docsub.mhtml?i=dispatch&s=cagaptay090904(Visited on 10 May 2006)

[19] See report at http://archive.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=114102 (Visited on 10 May 2006)

[20] Reported in the New Strait Times 19 June 2004

[21] See Christopher F Foss, “Malaysia accepts Pakistani ATGW” Jane’s Defence Weekly - July 14, 2004